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INTRODUCTION  
 
Online fraud is estimated to cost individuals and companies billions of dollars each year (Internet 
Crime Complaint Center 2017; Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 2016), and is one 
of the most common types of cybercrime encountered by national police agencies across the world 
(UN 2013). As such, several scholars and reports rate online fraud as the greatest threat to e-
commerce (Jotwani and Dutta 2016; Internet Crime Complaint Center 2014). While online fraud can 
take different forms, including auto-fraud scams, online dating romance scams, extortion scams, and 
auction scams (Whitty 2013; Grabosky 2015), online non-payment and non-delivery scams have been 
among the most common and costly forms of online fraud during the last three years. Indeed, in both 
2016 and 2017, more than 80,000 victims in the United States alone have lost more than $140 million 
annually to non-payment/non-delivery frauds (Internet Crime Complaint Center 2017).  
Still, despite the growing public and legal interest in online fraud and in its consequences to 
individuals and business, the criminological literature has yet to study fraudsters’ Modus Operandi 
throughout the progression of an online scam (Holt and Graves 2007; Lea, Fischer, and Evans 2009), 
and their responses to situational stimuli during the progression of the criminal event. To address this 
empirical gap, we draw on the criminal event perspective (Luckenbill 1977; Felson and Steadman 
1983; Short 1998) to investigate how consistent is the use of “urgency” cues among online fraudsters 
when they attempt to defraud potential targets. Specifically, building on past research that focuses on 
fraudsters’ deceptive strategies (Ferreira and Lenzini 2015; Atkins and Huang 2013), and drawing on 
claims from the Interpersonal Deception Theory (Buller and Burgoon 1996), we explore whether 
verbal and non-verbal cues of urgency are presented consistently to online fraud targets throughout 
the progression of an online non-payment fraud attempt. Moreover, integrating situational 
explanations of crime (Briar and Pilavin 1965; Osgood et al. 1996) with Buller and Burgoon’s (1996) 
claims, we explore whether fraudsters react to the emergence of situations conducive to online fraud 
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by increasing the presentation of urgency cues throughout the progression of an online non-payment 
fraud attempt.  
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Online fraud 
With the expansion of the online environment, the Internet has become a popular medium for scams, 
connecting fraudsters with numerous potential targets (Pratt et al. 2010; Grabosky 2015; Reyns et al. 
2016). Indeed, various types of online fraud have been developed by scammers, including sales and 
investment frauds (Grabosky et al. 2001), fraudulent ordering of goods (US Department of Justice 
2004), auction frauds (Bailey 2009), romance scams (Whitty 2013; Whitty 2015a), and online 
advance fee frauds (Grabosky 2015). Among the numerous types of online frauds, non-payment and 
non-delivery frauds are among the most diverse (i.e., facilitated in different ways), common, and 
costly (Grabosky 2015; Internet Crime Complaint Center 2017).  
Online non-payment frauds are scams in which goods and services are shipped to a potential 
buyer (consistent with the buyer’s request), but payment is never received (Internet Crime Complaint 
Center 2017). Specifically, online fraudsters look for legitimate users’ posts of “for sale” items on 
classified advertisement websites, and respond to legitimate ads via email or phone (Aleem and Atwi-
Boasiako 2011). Once establishing the availability of a potential target, the scammer agrees to pay for 
the advertised product and sends a fake payment receipt (e.g. Paypal receipt) to the target (Aleem and 
Atwi-Boasiako 2011). If the potential target is defrauded, the victim sends out the goods to the 
scammer, yet receives no actual payment in return. In contrast, in an online non-delivery fraud, a 
payment is sent to a potential seller, but goods and services are never received (Internet Crime 
Complaint Center 2017). Under this type of scam, online scammers advertise an item, a real estate 
property, or a service over classified advertisement websites (e.g. “Craigslist.com” or 
“Backpage.com”), and wait for potential targets to contact them regarding the listing either over 
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email or phone (Button and Cross 2017). Once a potential target contacts the scammers, the online 
offenders push the target to send a certain amount of money for either purchasing the product or 
service or securing the rights to the real estate.  
As in offline fraud events, fraudsters commonly employ urgency cues in their attempts to 
initiate online non-payment /non-delivery scams. Specifically, online fraudsters take advantage of 
heuristics in decision-making that are associated with peripheral processing (Johnson et al. 1993; 
Cowan 1986), and attempt to create a sense of urgency among potential victims by presenting very 
attractive offers that are presumably available only for a short time (Lea et al. 2009; Doocy et al 
2001; Shichor et al. 2001). Indeed, several analyses of the content of fraudulent emails (for instance 
spam emails) indicate that online scammers almost always employ urgency cues during their efforts 
to lure potential victims into compliance (Atkins and Huang 2013; Holt and Graves 2007). 
Unfortunately, although this past research has advanced our understanding of the strategies used by 
online scammers to deceive their victims (Wang et al. 2012), these studies tend to draw on 
problematic samples (Ferreira et al 2015; Holt and Graves 2007), and provide no information 
regarding the interaction between the scammers and the victim throughout the progression of the 
criminal event (Atkins and Huang 2015; Ferreira and Lenzini 2015). As a result, no attention has 
been given to identifying the important cues that trigger offenders to pursue or abort fraud attempts. 
Moreover, these studies analyzed the content of unsolicited spam emails that are designed to reduce 
the number of replies from individuals who are unlikely to fall victim to these scams (Herley 2012). 
To address these empirical gaps, we explore how online fraud is perpetrated and perpetuated 
(Holtfreter et al. 2005), focusing on the multiple communications between online scammers and 
victims. To frame these communications, we adopt the criminal event perspective (Lukenbill 1977; 
Meier, Kennedy, and Sacco 2001) and draw on “Interpersonal Deception Theory” (Buller and 
Burgoon 1996) to form hypotheses regarding the role of criminal opportunities (Briar and Pilavin 
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1965) in conditioning the effect of initial deception displays of urgency on subsequent deceptive 
cues.  
The Criminal Event Perspective and Interpersonal Deception Theory  
The criminal event perspective focuses attention on the microsocial level of illegal behaviors, and 
goes beyond offenders’ motivation to include insights regarding all parts of the etiology of crime, 
including the interaction between criminal events participants, the unfolding of criminal events, and 
the settings in which these events occur (Short 1998). Originating in the symbolic interactionist 
perspective (Goffman 1955), this approach suggests that a comprehensive explanation of crime 
should incorporate knowledge regarding the way offenders and victims present themselves and 
interact, and that the settings in which these interactions occur shape the interactive process between 
actors (Meier, Kennedy, and Sacco 2001). However, although advocates of the criminal event 
perspective believe this approach is relevant for all types of predatory crimes, prior studies employing 
this perspective have only focused on the interactional processes leading to violent offenses 
(Luckenbill 1977; Felson and Steadman 1983; Fagan and Wilkinson 1998; Deibert and Miethe 2003). 
Moreover, these studies do not draw on a cohesive theoretical model that allows for the development 
of clear research hypotheses regarding the interactions between offenders and victims, as well as the 
progression of the criminal event. We believe that Interpersonal Deception Theory (Buller and 
Burgoon 1994) can fill this theoretical void, and prove useful in understanding the interaction 
between fraudsters and targets during the progression of a criminal event.  
The underlying premise of Interpersonal Deception Theory (Buller and Burgoon 1994, 1996; 
Burgoon and Buller 2015) is that social interactions involve a dynamic exchange of both verbal (i.e. 
linguistic and content cues (Carlson et al. 2004)) and non-verbal messages between senders and 
receivers, who influence each other in an interdependent fashion (White and Burgoon 2001). 
Deception, in this sense, occurs when a deceiver controls the presentation of information (including 
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the transmission of verbal and non-verbal messages, as well as the manipulation of situational cues) 
in an effort to change a target’s beliefs in a way that the deceiver knows is dishonest (Buller and 
Burgoon 1994). According to Buller and Burgoon (1994; 1996), deceptive communication is similar 
to normative communication, since it requires active participation from both the deceiver and the 
target, and since it involves the presentation of both strategic and non-strategic behaviors (Goffman 
1969). Non-strategic behaviors are unintentional and unconscious actions that are presented by a 
sender during the progression of an interaction. Strategic behaviors, on the other hand, are purposive 
actions that involve intentionality and conscious awareness. Buller and Burgoon (1996) contended 
that since deceivers engage in activities designed to manage information, behavior, and image, they 
are more likely to display strategic behaviors than truth tellers1 (Burgoon, Proudfoot, Schuetzler, and 
Wilson 2014). However, to increase their credibility and evade detection, deceivers accept feedback 
regarding their own performance from those they interact with (i.e. their potential victims), and react 
to signs of suspicion by modifying their behaviors accordingly (see also Goffman 1955).  
Interpersonal Deception Theory and The Online Environment  
Although several studies investigated the way in which initial deception cues shape deceivers’ 
behaviors along the progression of deceptive interactions in an offline environment (Burgoon, Buller, 
White, Afifi, and Buslig 1999; White and Burgoon 2001), only scant research has been devoted to 
how computer mediated environments influence communication patterns between deceivers and 
targets throughout the progression of online criminal events (Pak and Zhou 2014). This is unfortunate 
because several scholars believe that the low level of context interactivity facilitated by computing 
environments provides fertile ground for norm breaking and deception. Carlson and associates (2004) 
argued that low interactivity communication platforms like email and text messaging support the 
development of deceptive behavior by allowing communicators to monitor only a few 
communication channels, and consequently simplify offenders’ efforts to synchronize and coordinate 
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the social cues they transmit over these channels. In contrast, other scholars believe that although 
non-verbal cues such as facial expression (Goffman 1955) and vocal pitch cannot be transmitted over 
a text-based interaction, other non-verbal cues can be transmitted to convey senders’ feelings and 
emotions (Kotlyar and Ariely 2013). For example, Byron and Bladrige (2007) showed that emails 
written in all capital letters could convey senders’ feelings of anger and urgency. Similarly, Kalman 
and Gergle (2014) demonstrated that letter repetition as an extension of a word (e.g. “sooo” and 
“thaaanks”) is used to convey emotional nuance.  
In line with the growing arguments that computer-mediated communications can transfer both 
verbal and non-verbal social cues, numerous studies have investigated the relationships between 
verbal and non-verbal cues and different types of online deception (Pak and Zhou 2014; Hauch, 
Blandon-Gitlin, Masip, and Sporer 2015). In general, most of these studies found that certain verbal 
and non-verbal communication cues are associated with deceptive behaviors. For example, Ho and 
colleagues (2015) reported that online deceivers are more likely to avoid using the words “no” and 
“not” while interacting with other online users than truth-tellers. Similarly, Derrick and colleagues 
(2013) found that deceivers had longer response latencies when interacting with online users over 
chat-based platforms than truth-tellers.  
Despite this research, only a few studies have focused on the interactive exchanges between 
deceivers and targets, and even less research has investigated how deceivers’ initial presentation of 
deceptive behaviors is correlated with their subsequent behaviors during the progression of the online 
crime (Pak and Zhou 2014). Moreover, only a few of these studies collected data from online users 
while preserving the context in which deceit takes place (Kotlyar and Ariely 2013), and none of them 
analyzed data collected from online criminals. Similarly, no previous study has tested how fraudsters 
identify criminal opportunities through the presentation of deception cues in general, and urgency 
cues in particular, during the progression of offline or online criminal events. We suspect that the 
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identification of a criminal opportunity could influence offenders’ situational motivation to pursue a 
criminal event (Briar and Piliavin 1965), and shape offenders’ presentations of both verbal and 
nonverbal deceptive cues throughout the progression of the online criminal event.  
Offline and Online Situations Conducive to Crime  
The role of environmental factors in determining both motivational and situational opportunities to 
offend has been discussed extensively in criminological scholarship during the last five decades 
(Briar and Piliavin 1965; Clarke 1997). Briar and Piliavin (1965) contended that exposure to 
situationally induced stimuli may shape individuals’ morals and behaviors and, in turn, that an 
individual’s engagement in a criminal event is the result of situational motivations to offend. More 
recently, Osgood and colleagues (1996) have expanded Briar and Piliavin (1965) claims to account 
for individual offending and violent behaviors among adolescents and youths. Specifically, 
integrating Briar and Piliavin’s (1965) situational conception of delinquent motivation with Cohen 
and Felson’s (1979) emphasis on individuals’ daily routines, Osgood and associates (1996) argued 
that situations in which deviance is easier and rewarding are likely to increase the probability of 
deviant behavior and crime. While Osgood and colleagues (1996) identified unique criminogenic 
situations under which juvenile delinquency is likely to ensue (i.e. unstructured socializing with 
peers), several scholars have acknowledged the role of criminal opportunities for the development of 
fraudulent behaviors. Roberds (1998) suggested that situations in which buyers and sellers do not 
have an ongoing business relationship, as well as those in which the payer’s identity cannot be traced, 
increase the likelihood of fraud. Moreover, Roberds (1998) contended that situations in which a seller 
cannot withhold delivery of an item until the buyer pays in full, and the payment is verified, increase 
the probability of fraud. Finally, Osgood and colleagues (1996) acknowledged the role of availability 
in the context of income tax fraud, noting that “income tax is impossible without earnings that are 
subject to taxation” (639).  
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Indeed, several studies have previously emphasized the role of target availability and 
suitability in increasing offenders’ situational motivations to offend, and in influencing the likelihood 
of a criminal event to occur (Cohen and Felson 1979; Wright and Decker 1994, 2011). Wright and 
Decker (1994) reported that burglars prefer to target residential houses that appear to host valuable 
items over houses that appear easy to break into. These scholars also observed that when seeking 
potential robbery targets, robbers attempt to confirm that the targets carry plenty of cash before 
initiating the criminal event (Wright and Decker 2011). Unfortunately, only scant research has tested 
the relationships between online situations conducive to crime and online offending. In fact, we were 
able to find only one study (Ingram and Hinduja 2008) that emphasized the role of availability of 
online targets as a key online situation that increases motivations to engage in crime. Specifically, 
Ingram and Hinduja (2008) reported that the availability and accessibility of pirated material in the 
online environment increased undergraduate students’ probability to engage in copyright 
infringement. Still, consistent with the underlying premise of situational explanations of crime (Briar 
and Piliavin 1965; Clarke 1997; Eck and Clarke 2003), and with Wright and Decker’s (1994, 2011) 
findings, our work seeks to assess the role of situations conducive to online fraud, and specifically of 
confirmed target suitability, in shaping online fraudsters’ deceptive behaviors during the progression 
of an online advance fee fraud attempt.  
The current study  
Since many online scammers employ verbal messages of urgency when contacting their victims with 
different fraudulent propositions (Atkins and Huang 2013; Wang et al. 2012), we first aim to assess 
how consistent the presentation of verbal cues of urgency is throughout the progression of an online 
non-payment fraud attempt. Adopting Goffman’s (1955) claim that inconsistency in how a person 
projects himself in society risks embarrassment and discrediting by others, we suspect that in the 
absence of suspicion signs among their targets, deceivers are likely to display consistent strategic 
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behaviors (Buller and Burgoon 1996). In this sense, we suspect that online scammers who 
incorporate verbal cues of urgency in their initial interactions with victims are likely to employ 
subsequent verbal cues of urgency along the progression of the online fraud attempt. Thus, our first 
research hypothesis suggests that verbal cues of urgency are more likely to appear in follow-up 
communications with online fraudsters who incorporated verbal cues of urgency in their initial 
communication with a target, compared to follow-up communications from online fraudsters who did 
not incorporate verbal cues of urgency in their initial communications with targets. 
Relatedly, drawing on Buller and Burgoon’s (1996) assumption that deceivers accept 
feedback regarding their own performance from their targets and adjust their behaviors accordingly, 
we suspect that upon receiving clear signs of target suitability and online opportunities to defraud, 
online scammers believe that the targets have accepted their façade and are ready to comply with the 
scammers’ requests. In order to present consistency in their strategic behaviors and avoid raising 
suspicion, the scammers will likely continue using verbal messages that they used in previous 
interactions with their targets. Therefore, our second hypothesis suggests that confirming target 
suitability will increase the probability of verbal cues of urgency in follow-up communications with 
online fraudsters who incorporated verbal cues of urgency in their initial probe, compared to when a 
feedback regarding target suitability is missing.   
Consistent with the assumption that deceivers employ both verbal and non-verbal deceptive 
cues during their interaction with victims, we also seek to discover whether initial verbal cues of 
urgency are synchronized with subsequent non-verbal cues. Specifically, in line with the assumption 
that computer-mediated environments could support the transmission of nonverbal cues (Derrick et 
al. 2013), we believe that online scammers may support the urgency façade they are trying to present 
to their targets by communicating non-verbal cues of urgency. One type of nonverbal cue of urgency 
that is commonly employed by telemarketing fraudsters to create a sense of urgency among their 
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victims involves increasing the number of contacts with a target (Shichor et al. 2001). Similarly, we 
suspect that online scammers who attempt to create a sense of urgency among their targets will 
increase the frequency of their online contact (through emails, IM, etc.) with victims. Thus, our third 
research hypothesis suggests that the frequency of repeated communications between scammers who 
incorporate verbal cues of urgency in their initial contact with targets will be higher than the 
frequency of repeated communications between online scammers who do not incorporate initial 
verbal cues of urgency in their initial contact with targets. 
Finally, we suspect that confirmation of target suitability may enhance the effect of initial 
verbal cues of urgency on the frequency of email communication between online scammers who 
employ verbal cues of urgency and potential targets. Specifically, it is possible that targets’ 
willingness to share details about the availability of situations conducive to crime will be interpreted 
by online scammers as a sign of the target’s willingness to comply without expressing suspicion. As 
such, the online scammers who employ verbal cues of urgency may believe that there is no need for 
them to modify their strategic behaviors (Buller and Burgoon 1996), and instead, may introduce 
subsequent non-verbal cues of urgency that coincide with the urgency façade. Therefore, our final 
research hypothesis suggests that the frequency of repeated communications with online scammers 
will be higher when feedback regarding the availability of suitable target is received by scammers 
who incorporate verbal cues of urgency in their initial contact with a target, compared to when a 
feedback regarding target suitability is missing.  
DATA AND METHODS  
In order to provide a clear understanding of the sequence of events during the progression of online 
fraud, we followed Deibert and Miethe’s (2003) approach and initiated the collection of processual 
data (i.e. data that provides clear temporal sequencing of actions during the progression of a criminal 
event) on online non-payment fraud attempts while engaging with the users of an online classified 
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advertisement website.  
Procedure  
Drawing on Kshetri’s (2010) claim that geographic locations play important role in determining 
targets attractiveness to online fraud activities, we selected 10 large metropolitan areas (San 
Francisco, Seattle, New York, Boston, LA, San Diego, Portland , Washington DC, Chicago, and 
Denver) and 10 small towns (Twin Tiers, Cumberland Valley, Meadville, Susanville, Siskiyou, 
Hanford-Corcoran, Santa Maria, Winchester, Southwest, and Eastern Colorado) in the U.S.A., where 
we advertised the sale of four types of products– cell phones, computers, jewelry, and auto parts– 
over the classified advertisement webpages that are designated for serving these locations. Our 
decision to advertise our items in both large metropolitans and small towns draws on past research’s 
findings suggesting that residents in small towns with low shop accessibility buy and sell products 
more often online (Farag et al 2006), and consequently, may be more susceptible to online fraud 
activities. Each ad included information on a single item, and the requested price for it. Items’ prices 
ranged from $110 to $700. Examples of the type of advertisements we posted under each product 
category are presented in Appendix A, Panel A. We decided to post advertisements for these specific 
products since we found that these items were popular at Amazon.com. The prices we asked for in 
our advertisements for used products were substantially higher than the prices advertised for identical 
yet new products on Amazon.com (Alem and Atwi-Boasiako 2011). Our decision to overprice our 
items was driven by a “Scam Alert” posted by the Federal Trade Commission’s Consumer Protection 
Team, which indicated that online fraudsters respond to “for sale” ads independent of the seller 
asking price, while legitimate online consumers are reluctant to reply to posts of overpriced products 
(Tuscan 2014).  
 In order to minimize potential biases in our data collection, we programmed our servers to 
post the advertisements in an evenly distributed rate across posting times and product categories. 
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Specifically, we posted our ads at a low rate2 of one advertisement per category per city, every 48 
hours (Park et al. 2014). By the end of the three-month experimental period (from 4/15/2013 to 
7/19/2013), we had posted 1,376 advertisements on the local classified advertisement websites of the 
20 selected cities. However, since 747 of these advertisements were flagged and deleted by the 
classified advertisement website team, only 629 of the advertisements (an average of 157.3 ads per 
product category) remained posted until they expired (typically after 7 days)3.  
To enable an email exchange with potential online consumers, we opened 42 new email 
accounts,4 periodically checked the 42 inboxes, identified responses to our advertisement, and replied 
to all incoming emails with a subject line that directly referenced the subject of our post. To simplify 
this process, we looked for a list of eight keywords in the email received in our 42 email inboxes, and 
once identifying one or more of these words, generated a predetermined and consistent response that 
adequately reacted to each word. For instance, once we identified the word “price” in the potential 
online consumer’s email, we generated the following response: “The price is X, firm.” Similarly, if a 
potential online consumer asked about the advertised item’s condition in his probe email, we 
generated the following response: “The condition is almost perfect since it was not used frequently.” 
When multiple words were identified in a single communication, we combined multiple sentences in 
a single response. If we identified none of the keywords, no response was sent to the potential online 
consumer. Appendix A, Panel B presents the list of keywords we searched in the emails and the 
corresponding response we generated to each of these words. The consistent responses we generated 
allowed us to exchange multiple rounds of emails with potential online fraudsters. Appendix B, Panel 
A presents an example of a typical exchange our team had with online fraudsters. The 
communication between the research team and an interested online consumer/fraudster was 
terminated if  the potential online consumer/fraudster did not respond to our email or if none of the 
key words which triggered the research team’s response appeared in the email we received. 
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Importantly, our research design was approved by the IRB committee in the University of Maryland.  
Sample  
We received a total of 19,204 emails in our 42 email accounts during the experimental period. Of 
these, 13,215 emails were initial probe emails sent to us by potential online consumers who were 
interested in the items we advertised. The remaining emails received in our inboxes were mainly 
spam emails and emails sent from email service providers (e.g. Gmail and Yahoo). From the 13,215 
scam-related first responses, we identified 8,048 emails with a subject line that replied directly to the 
subject of our post, searched the email body for the relevant keywords, and sent first replies to the 
online consumers. By sending a reply to the online consumers, an email thread was automatically 
generated in our email inboxes.  
We received at least one unique response to 1,140 of the email responses we sent in reply to 
inquiries about our ads. Importantly, during our communication with the interested online customers 
we received 623 unique emails (making 623 unique email threads) with fake PayPal payment 
notifications stating that funds were transferred to our PayPal account, followed by a request for us to 
send the relevant product to the consumer’s mailing address. Since none of the PayPal payment 
confirmation emails arrived from legitimate PayPal email accounts, and since we never set-up PayPal 
accounts for this project, the fake receipts constitute strong evidence that those emails were sent by 
online fraudsters. In contrast, the other 517 email threads did not include neither fake payment 
notification, nor other signs of fraudulent activity. Therefore, one may suggest that these emails were 
sent by legitimate potential online consumers. Since the focus of this paper is on online fraudsters’ 
deceptive cues, our final sample consists of the 623 email threads that included that fake PayPal 
notifications and that were certainly sent by online fraudsters.  
Dependent measures  
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The unit of analysis in this work is the email thread (i.e. an email message that includes a running list 
of all the succeeding replies, starting with the original email), which encompasses the progression of 
an online non-payment fraud attempt event. To test our first and second research hypotheses, we 
constructed the measure subsequent verbal cues of urgency. Specifically, drawing on the rationale 
proposed by the “Manifest Content Analysis” approach (Maruna 2010) and its implementation in the 
criminological field (Welch, Fenwick and Roberts 1998), and consistent with the technical operation 
of several existing email filters that are designed to identify and classify email urgency (Horvitz and 
Apacible 2009), we identified the urgency words “ASAP,” “soon,” and “fast” in email messages we 
received from online fraudsters who responded to our conversation engine, and created a dummy 
variable indicating the presence of at least one of these words in the email message. Importantly, the 
three urgency-keywords we used for constructing this dependent variable are used by bulk-filters to 
identify, flag, and classify email messages for urgency and importance (Horvitz and Apacible 2009). 
 To investigate our third and fourth research hypotheses we created the measure subsequent 
non-verbal cues of urgency. Following Shichor and colleagues’ (2001) conceptualization of non-
verbal cues of urgency, this measure is a simple count of the number of email responses we received 
from online scammers regarding the items we advertised. Consistent with Shichor et al. (2001), we 
associate a higher number of emails from a unique online scammer during a unique interaction 
regarding a product we advertised as a non-verbal cue of urgency.  
Key independent measures  
To investigate whether initial presentation of urgency cues determine the presentation of both non-
verbal and verbal cues of urgency throughout the progression of online non-payment fraud attempts, 
we identified emails received in our email inboxes from potential online scammers that contained at 
least one of the three urgency keywords. Specifically, in line with the operation of Horvitz and 
Apacible’s (2009) bulk-email filter, we identified the urgency words “ASAP,” “soon,” and “fast” in 
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the first emails messages we received from online fraudsters to construct the measure initial verbal 
cues of urgency (1= at least one urgency word is present in the scammer’s first email). 
To assess how the discovery of target suitability and situations conducive to online fraud 
influences the presentation of deception cues throughout the progression of the online criminal event, 
we distinguished between probe emails that requested information regarding the condition of the 
advertised item and probe emails that did not, and used those probes to construct our measure for 
confirmation of target suitability. Specifically, if the online scammers asked about the advertised item 
condition in his probe email, we sent the following response: “The condition is almost perfect since it 
was not used frequently.” In the absence of this keyword in the probe email, we did not disclose any 
information about the item’s condition. Appendix B, Panel B presents examples of probe emails that 
received confirmation of target suitability, and of probe emails that did not receive such a response. 
Thus, the measure we generated is a binary variable indicating whether or not we sent potential 
fraudsters explicit confirmation regarding the item condition (1=information regarding item condition 
was sent to scammers).  
Control variables  
We used a list of measures designed to control for potential influences of the ad’s content on online 
scammers’ probability to consistently pursue both verbal and non-verbal cues of urgency. We 
generated a list of dummy variables to indicate whether the posted ad offered an auto part, a 
cellphone, a computer, or jewelry for sale. The price is a measure of the asking price (in U.S. dollars) 
of the item advertised. Finally, since we posted our advertisements in both major metropolitan areas 
and small towns, we composed the dummy variable major metropolitan to indicate the location in 
which the ad was posted (1= major metropolitan). Means and standard deviations for all the 
dependent and independent variables are reported in Table 1.  
[TABLE 1 HERE] 
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Analytic strategy  
To assess the direct and interactive effects of initial verbal cues of urgency and confirmation of target 
suitability on our first dependent measure (i.e. subsequent verbal cues of urgency), we estimated a 
series of logistic regressions (Long 1997). Due to the positively skewed distribution of our email 
contacts count measure, as well as an observed overdispersion when estimating a simple Poisson 
model, we employed a series of negative binomial regression models (Osgood 2000), to estimate the 
direct and interactive effects of initial verbal cues of urgency and confirmation of target suitability on 
the number of emails we received from online scammers (i.e. non-verbal cues or scarcity). 
RESULTS  
Before investigating our key research hypotheses, we briefly describe our unique sample 
characteristics. As presented in Table 1, the most common email thread that was initiated by an 
online scammer was initiated in response to the jewelry ads we posted on the classified ad website 
(36%), followed by computer ads (28%), cellphone ads (24%), and auto-part ads (12%). Importantly, 
18% of the scammers’ probe emails included specific words that are aimed to convey a sense of 
urgency on behalf of the scammer, while 20% of the initial probe emails received a confirmation of 
target suitability from our research team. Finally, the average number of subsequent email responses 
we received during our online engagement with online fraudsters was 2.59 emails, while 70% of the 
subsequent emails we received included urgency words.  
Turning to our first research hypothesis, we next present findings from a Logit model that 
estimates the effect of initial verbal cues of urgency on the probability of subsequent verbal cues of 
urgency in follow-up email communications between the online scammers and our research team. 
Results from this analysis are presented in Table 2, Model 1. As indicates in the model, scammers’ 
presentations of verbal cues of urgency in the probe email increases the odds ratio for the appearance 
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of verbal cues of urgency in subsequent email communications between the online scammers and our 
team. However, this effect is only marginally significant (p < 0.1).   
To test our second research hypothesis, we specify an interaction term between initial verbal 
cues of urgency and confirmation of target suitability, and estimate its effect on the probability that 
subsequent verbal cues of urgency will be presented by online scammers during the progression of an 
online non-payment fraud attempt. Findings from this analysis are reported in Table 2, Model 2. As 
indicated in the model, the interaction between confirmation of target suitability and initial verbal 
cues of scarcity is significant and positive, suggesting that confirmation of target suitability enhances 
the effect of initial verbal cues of urgency on subsequent presentation of verbal cues of urgency.  
Next, we re-estimate Model 2 while introducing the list of controls and accounting for their 
potential confounding effects on both the dependent and independent variables. Findings from this 
model are reported in Table 2, Model 3. As indicated in the model, the effects of none of these 
controls is significant on subsequent presentation of verbal cues of urgency. However, the effect of 
the interaction between initial verbal cues of urgency and confirmation of target suitability remains 
significant. Notably though this model presents a relatively low pseudo R-squared value. Indeed, the 
relatively low pseudo R-squared value may be a reason for concern in these models. However, it 
should be noted that the only true utility of pseudo R-squared in non-parametric model is in 
comparing the Pseudo R-squared values against other pseudo R-squared values of the same type, 
generated from the same data, on the same outcome (Long & Freeze, 2006). Much like pseudo R-
Squared values, Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) values could also be calculated in order to 
estimate which model is more parsimonious, and fits the data better. Both the pseudo R-squared and 
AIC values reported for these models suggest that Model 3 represent a substantial improvement over 
both Model 1 and Model 2, and that the effect of this interaction term is not trivial in the model. 
[TABLE 2 HERE] 
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To visualize the magnitude of this effect we plot in Figure 1 the predicted probability of 
subsequent verbal cues of urgency for online scammers who either incorporated urgency verbal cues 
in their probe email or did not, and who either received a confirmation of target suitability or did not. 
As indicated in the figure, the predicted probability of verbal cues of urgency in subsequent 
communication between online fraudsters and our research team ranges between 63% and 67% when 
scammers are not presented with confirmation of target suitability. However, the predicted 
probability of subsequent verbal cues of urgency is 89% when confirmation of target suitability is 
presented in response to probe emails with urgency words. In contrast, the predicted probability of 
subsequent verbal cues of urgency is 61% when confirmation of target suitability is presented in 
response to probe emails with no urgency words. 
[FIGURE 1 HERE] 
To test our third research hypothesis and assess whether the presentation of verbal cues of 
urgency is synchronized with non-verbal cues of urgency throughout the progression of an online 
non-payment fraud attempt, we estimated the effect of initial verbal cues of urgency on the number of 
follow-up email communications between online scammers and our research team, using a Negative 
Binomial Regression. Results from this analysis are presented in Table 3, Model 1. As indicated in 
the model, the effect of scammers’ presentation of verbal cues of urgency in the probe email is 
significant and positive, suggesting that the presence of initial verbal cues of urgency significantly 
increases the frequency of email communication between online scammers and the research team.  
Next, we estimate the effect of the interaction term between verbal cues of urgency and 
confirmation of target suitability on the number of follow-up email communications between online 
scammers and our conversation engine. Findings from this analysis are reported in Table 3, Model 2. 
In line with the findings reported when predicting subsequent verbal cues of urgency, the effect of the 
interaction between verbal cues of urgency and confirmation of target suitability is significant and 
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positive on the number of email communications between online scammers and the conversation 
engine. This finding supports the assumption that confirmation of target suitability enhances the 
effect of initial verbal cues of urgency on subsequent presentation of non-verbal cues of urgency.  
Finally, we re-run the model while introducing the list of controls and accounting for potential 
confounding effects on both the dependent and independent variables. Findings from this model are 
reported in Table 3, Model 3. Note that the effects of cellphone, computers, and jewelry ads are 
significant and positive in the model. In contrast, the effect of major metropolitan measure is 
significant and negative. Still, the effect of the interaction term between initial verbal cues of urgency 
and confirmation of target suitability remains significant in the model, suggesting that the interactive 
effect is not trivial. Moreover, both the pseudo R-squared and AIC values reported for these models 
suggest that Model 3 represent a substantial improvement over both Model 1 and Model 2. 
 [TABLE 3 HERE] 
To visualize the magnitude of this effect, in Figure 2 we plot the predicted number of email 
communications between online scammers and the research team for online scammers who either 
incorporated urgency verbal cues in their probe email or did not, and for scammers who either 
received a confirmation of target suitability or did not. As indicated in the figure, the predicted 
number of email communications between online scammers and the research team is 2.3 emails on 
average when scammers are not presented with confirmation of target suitability. However, the 
predicted number of email communications between online scammers and the research team is 3.6 
emails when confirmation of target suitability is presented in response to probe emails with urgency 
words. In contrast, the predicted number of email communications between online scammers and the 
research team is only 1.9 emails when confirmation of target suitability is presented in response to 
probe emails with no urgency words. 
 [FIGURE 2 HERE] 
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Sensitivity analysis   
Although the findings presented so far support our research hypotheses, one may suggests that by 
focusing our analyses on the 623 email threads in which we received a fake payment notification 
only, it is impossible to discern whether the observed patterns are unique to online offenders. Indeed, 
it could be the case that legitimate online consumers who are in a rush to purchase an item online 
adopt a similar strategy to that we observed among online fraudsters. Therefore, ideally, our 
assessments of the four research hypotheses should also include an exploration of the way potential 
online consumers (i.e. non-fraudsters) employ both verbal and non-verbal cues of urgency during 
their interactions with online sellers. In order to address this issue, we re-estimated all the models we 
reported above using data from the 517 email threads that did not include a fraudulent payment 
notification. Since none of these email-threads included concrete evidence for an online fraud 
attempt, we suspect that these email communications may have been with legitimate online 
consumers who were genuinely interested in purchasing the advertised items. Results from these 
analyses (see Appendix C for the findings from all re-estimated models) reveal that none of the 
verbal and non-verbal consistencies of urgency we observed among online-fraudsters are evident 
among non-fraudsters. Moreover, confirmation of item availability does not moderate the effect of 
initial verbal cues of urgency on subsequent verbal and non-verbal cues of urgency.  
 [TABLE 4 HERE] 
DISCUSSION  
Despite the growing public and legal interest in online fraud, and the potential of the social sciences 
to guide both technical and policy efforts to prevent and mitigate this phenomenon, relatively little 
attention has been given in the criminological literature to investigating fraudsters’ Modus Operandi 
(Lea et al 2009), and their responses to situational stimuli during the progression of these criminal 
events. To bridge this empirical gap we adopted the criminal event perspective (Meier et al 2001), 
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and drew on claims from the Interpersonal Deception Theory (Buller and Burgoon 1996) to explore 
whether verbal and non-verbal cues of urgency are presented consistently to online-fraud targets 
throughout the progression of an online non-payment fraud attempt. Moreover, integrating Buller and 
Burgoon’s (1996) claims with situational explanations of crime (Briar and Pilavin 1965; Osgood et 
al. 1996), we explored whether the confirmation that a situation is conducive to online fraud impacts 
the presentation of urgency cues throughout the progression of an online non-payment fraud attempt. 
Analyzing data collected through unique email communications between online fraudsters and our 
research team revealed several key findings.  
 First, in contrast to previous research that analyzed the content of spam emails and reported 
that many online scammers employ verbal cues of urgency when contacting their victims with 
different fraudulent propositions (Wang et al. 2012), we find that verbal cues of urgency in initial 
probe emails sent to potential targets of non-payment fraud are relatively rare, with only 18% of the 
probe emails received in our email inboxes incorporating verbal cues of urgency like “fast,” “soon,” 
and “ASAP.” Similarly, only 20% of the probe emails actively sought to confirm the target’s 
suitability by attempting to gather intelligence about the target condition and functionality. Future 
research should explore how common the use of other persuasive approaches (for example authority, 
social proof, and liking (Ferreria and Lezini 2015)) is in the context of online fraud in general, and in 
non-payment/non-delivery fraud attempts in particular.   
Second, we find some evidence that verbal cues of urgency are more likely to be incorporated 
in fraudsters’ subsequent emails to targets if verbal cues of urgency were included in the fraudster’s 
initial probe email, compared to threads where such cues were absent from the initial probe. 
Moreover, we find that confirmation of target suitability increases online fraudsters’ consistent use of 
verbal cues of urgency throughout the progression of the online fraud attempt, if the initial probe 
email included verbal cues of urgency. These first of its kind “context-embedded” findings support 
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Buller and Burgoon’s (1996) suggestion that in the absence of clear signs of suspicion from targets, 
deceivers are likely to display consistent strategic online behaviors throughout the progression of 
online fraud. However, the estimated model fit values calculated for these models suggest that these 
findings should be interpreted cautiously.  
Third, consistent with the assumption that fraudsters employ both verbal and non-verbal 
deceptive cues during their interactions with victims, we observed that the volume of email messages 
sent to potential targets is significantly higher among scammers who incorporated verbal cues of 
urgency in their probe emails, compared to scammers who did not incorporate initial verbal cues of 
urgency in their probe emails. This pattern is consistent with the pattern observed by Shichor and 
associates (2001) in the context of telemarketing fraudsters, and offers support to the suggestion that 
computer-mediated environments could support the transmission of nonverbal cues in general 
(Derrick et al. 2013) and the transmission of non-verbal urgency cues in particular.  
Finally, we found supporting evidence for our last research hypothesis, suggesting that the 
confirmation of target suitability enhances the effect of initial verbal cues of urgency on the 
frequency of email communication between online scammers who employ verbal cues of urgency 
and potential targets. Specifically, we reported that the confirmation of target suitability increases the 
volume of email messages sent to potential targets by online fraudsters if the initial probe email 
included verbal cues of urgency. Indeed, we believe that targets’ willingness to share details about the 
availability of situations conducive to crime is perceived by online scammers as a sign of compliance, 
and results in subsequent presentation of non-verbal cues of urgency that coincide with the urgency 
façade (Buller and Burgoon 1996). 
The findings reported in our paper emphasize the relevance of the criminal event perspective 
in understanding the dynamics of online fraud, and expand the body of criminological literature that 
has already investigated key insights from this perspective in the context of violent crime (Luckenbill 
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1977; Meier et al. 2001). Moreover, our seminal findings demonstrate the importance of situations 
conducive to online fraud for determining offenders’ presentation of deceptive cues while attempting 
to defraud their victims. Future research should further explore how the emergence of situations 
conducive to online crime dictates the presentation of other known deceptive cues (for instance, 
authority and kindness (Ferreria and Lezini 2015)) throughout the progression of an online fraud. We 
suspect that such future work should further apply insights from Buller and Burgoon’s (1994, 1996) 
Interpersonal Deception Theory. In parallel, we believe that efforts should be devoted to the 
development of a more comprehensive criminological theory that can investigate and predict the 
progression of a criminal event.  
Besides the important theoretical contribution of this research to the criminological literature, 
we believe that this work also carries practical implications for spam filter designers and 
organizations that attempt to detect and prevent online fraud victimization. Specifically, we know that 
email providers consistently calibrate their spam filters to try and prevent spam emails from ending 
up in email users’ inboxes. Unfortunately, these spam filters do not completely prevent spam email 
from arriving to potential targets (Jakobson and Leedy 2016). The approach we bring paves a path for 
the design of new tools that could monitor the series of interactions occurring during the progression 
of a criminal event in effort to detect, flag, and block them from result in victimization. 
Still, this work is not without limitations. First, in many instances the classified ad website 
flagged and deleted our advertisements from their servers. Although we were unable to identify a 
systematic reason as to why some advertisements were removed, we have no reason to believe that 
this issue impacted the results obtained, as scammers were presumably as likely to respond and to use 
urgency cues for these ads as for any others. Second, we did not initiate contact with potential 
consumers and scammers who did not have the ad’s subject line in the header. Relatedly, although 
the key words we choose as a trigger for response appeared frequently in both a pilot study we 
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conducted,  as well as used by other scholars to set email filters (Horvitz and Apacible 2009), future 
research should investigate whether responses to other words change online fraudsters’ responses, 
and the progression of an online fraud event. Finally, we cannot really identify the individuals who 
contacted us throughout the data collection period, and assess their demographic characteristics 
(Button and Cross 2017), personality traits (Holtfreter, Reisig, and Pratt 2008), or motivations 
behinds their responses to our advertisements. Collecting such data could have improved our models’ 
predictability. Moreover, we cannot determine with a very high level of confidence if the exchanges 
we had over 1,140 email responses were with unique or overlapping online consumers/scammers. 
However, we believe that since the unit of analysis in this work is the progression of a criminal event 
this generate less of an issue5. Therefore, despite these limitations, we believe that this paper 
contributes to our understanding of the development of online fraud events, and provides additional 
evidence for the promise embedded in criminological research for guiding the detection, mitigation, 
and prevention of online crimes.   
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics (N=623 Email Threads) 
 
 
  
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min-Max 
 
Dependent Variables 
      
   Subsequent Non-Verbal Cue of Urgency (# of emails) 2.59 2.35 0-15 
   Subsequent Verbal Cues of Urgency  0.70 0.45 0-1 
 
Independent Variables  
   
Ad Content     
   Auto part 0.12 0.49 0-1 
   Cellphone 0.24 0.42 0-1 
   Computers 0.28 0.45 0-1 
   Jewelry 0.36 0.48 0-1 
   Price ($) 138.80 158.40 11-700 
    
Ad location     
   Major metropolitan  0.45 0.50 0-1 
    
Scammer’s First Email Content    
   Initial Verbal Cues of Urgency 0.18 0.38 0-1 
 
Research Team  Response  
   
   Confirmation of target suitability 0.20 0.40 0-1 
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  Table 2. Subsequent Verbal Cues of Urgency Regressed Over Ad Features and 
Scammers’ Initial Correspondence with Targets (N=623 Email Threads) 
Variables 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Coeff 
(SE) 
Odds  
Ratio 
Coeff 
(SE) 
Odds  
Ratio 
Coeff 
(SE) 
Odds 
Ratio 
Scammers’ First Email Content       
  Initial Verbal Cues of Urgency  .51+ 1.66 .10 1.10 .17 1.18 
  (.30)  (.35)  (.36)  
Research Team Response        
  Confirmation of target suitability - - -.18 .83 -.10 .90 
   (.21)  (.21)  
Interaction       
  Confirmation of target suitability ×    
 Initial Verbal Cues of Urgency - 
 
- 
 
1.66* 5.29 1.60* 
 
4.60 
   (.85)  (.85)  
Ad Content a       
Cellphone - - - - -.43 .65 
 
    (.31)  
Computers - - - - .13 1.13 
 
    (.33)  
Jewelry - - - - -.69 .50 
 
    (.28)  
  Price ($) - - - - -.01 .98 
     (.01)  
Ad Location        
  Major metropolitan  - - - - -.02 .98 
 
    (.17)  
       
Constant .52***  .56*** - 1.07*** - 
 (.09)  (.10)  (.21)  
       
Pseudo-R² .05  .05  .09  
AIC 817.3  816.45  804.70  
Log Likelihood  -406.65**  -404.25**  -397.36**  
a Reference category = auto parts 
+p ≤ .10; *p ≤ .05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 
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Table 3. Subsequent Non-Verbal Cues of Urgency Regressed Over Ad Features and Scammers’ 
Initial Correspondence with Targets (N=623 Email Threads) 
Variables 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Coeff 
(SE) 
Event  
Ratio 
Coeff 
(SE) 
Event  
Ratio 
Coeff 
(SE) 
Event  
Ratio 
Scammers’ First Email Content       
  Initial Verbal Cues of Urgency  .27* 1.31 .06 1.06 .01 1.01 
  (.11)  (.14)  (.14)  
Research Team Response        
  Confirmation of target suitability - - -.12 .89 -.18 .84 
   (.09)  (.09)  
Interaction       
  Confirmation of target suitability ×    
 Initial Verbal Cues of Urgency - 
 
- 
 
.60** 1.83 .61** 
 
1.85 
   (.23)  (.23)  
Ad Content a       
Cellphone - - - - .48*** 1.61 
 
    (.13)  
Computers - - - - .29* 1.34 
 
    (.14)  
Jewelry - - - - .51*** 1.66 
 
    (.12)  
  Price ($) - - - - -.00 .99 
     (.00)  
Ad Location        
  Major metropolitan  - - - - -.18** .83 
 
    (.07)  
       
Constant .80***  .82*** - .53*** - 
 (.04)  (.04)  (.11)  
Ln alpha -1.19  -1.22  -1.33  
Pseudo-R² .04  .05  .11  
AIC 2455.90  2450.47  2438.60  
Log Likelihood  -1196.95**  -1193.63**  -1178.53**  
a Reference category = auto parts 
+p ≤ .10; *p ≤ .05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 
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Figure 1. Predicted Probability of Verbal Cues of Urgency at Follow Up (N = 623 Email 
Threads) 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Predicted Number of Subsequent Email Responses (N = 623 Email Threads) 
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ENDNOTES  
1 The strategic behaviors and communication patterns that could be employed by deceivers include delivering false and 
ambiguous messages to their targets, creating distance between themselves and others, and presenting an image of a 
sincere and trustworthy individual. 
 
2 In order not to interfere with the regular ad traffic on the website, we made sure that our advertisements accounted for 
only a small fraction of the total ads volume in each of the cities.  
 
3 No significant differences were found between the type of products and locations of advertisement that were deleted by 
the website owner and those that were not.   
 
4 We adhered to the classified ad website’s terms of use and restricted each of our accounts to posting in a single location, 
and at a posting rate of once every 48 hours. 
 
5 In analysis not shown, we restricted our sample to include email threads in which the content of the first email received 
in our email inboxes was significantly different across other first emails we received. Indeed, since the content of the first 
email we received from some of the potential costumers/online scammers was identical in 4% of the cases, one may 
suggest that those emails were sent from the same individuals.  Re-estimating all the models reported in this manuscript 
while restricting the sample to email thread with “unique” first emails yielded consistent results to those reported in the 
manuscript.    
 
